I am an Adjunct Assistant Professor at Zayed University in Abu Dhabi and an applied microeconomist working in experimental, environmental, health, and information economics. My research uses causal inference and quasi-experimental methods to study how individuals, firms, and governments make decisions when information is limited or strategically distorted.
My current work examines the economic consequences of fake reviews for trust and efficiency in online marketplaces, the siting of air quality monitors and the health effects of air pollution, and whether EPA enforcement actions change corporate environmental reporting. My work has been published in the Journal of Environmental Management, and my methods range from laboratory experiments to administrative data, satellite imagery, and machine learning.
Before joining Zayed University, I worked as an economist with the Office on Smoking and Health at the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. I hold a Ph.D. in Economics from Georgia State University.
PhD in Economics, 2024
Georgia State University
MS in Economics, 2020
Georgia State University
BA in Mathematics & Economics, 2011
Moravian University
Since 2013, China has added more than four thousand air quality monitoring stations that provide the public with real-time information on six airborne pollutants, i.e., particulate matter (PM) 2.5, PM10, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, ozone, and carbon monoxide. Authorities manage these monitors at four levels of the government: state, provincial, municipal, and county. Typically, pollution monitors are located where they could be deemed useful, for example, within more air-polluted areas or near schools, hospitals, road traffic, and industries. While the real-time information has helped individuals, firms, and governments make decisions; it is unclear how a government body makes siting decisions. This paper aims to answer three questions: Where are the pollution monitors located? What drives the decision to add a new monitor in a particular location? Is there a difference in location choice behavior between central and local governments in China? We find that, in 2021, central monitors were located in cleaner areas than local monitors, and both monitors were located around public buildings like hospitals. However, when it comes to new placements, both monitors are generally positioned in more polluted areas, with local monitors more likely to be placed in the ‘dirtiest’ locations. We also find that central and local monitors are both clustered around each other. … more
LinkI study the economic effects of fake reviews on user-generated information such as ratings and reviews and, ultimately, buyers/sellers in the online marketplace.
PDFI study firms’ compliance behavior after an inspection or an enforcement action by the EPA.
PDFThis paper examines the historical foundations of agglomeration economics, highlighting its enduring relevance in understanding the spatial organization of economic activity and the dynamics of industrial clusters.
PDFThis paper traces the historical development of the concept of human capital, emphasizing its evolution from early economic thought to its contemporary significance.
PDFAverage instructor rating: 4.6/5
Hybrid: Spring 2020
In-person: Spring 2022 · Syllabus
Online: Fall 2023
Online: Spring 2024